Abstract. We present a new tighter security proof for unbounded hash tree keyless signature (time-stamping) schemes that use Merkle-Damgård (MD) hash functions with Preimage Aware (PrA) compression functions. It is known that the PrA assumption alone is insufficient for proving the security of unbounded hash tree schemes against back-dating attacks. We show that many known PrA constructions satisfy a stronger Bounded Pre-Image Awareness (BPrA) condition that assumes the existence of an extractor E that is bounded in the sense that for any efficiently computable query string α, the number of outputs y for which E(y, α) succeeds does not exceed the number of queries in α. We show that blockcipher based MD-hash functions with rate-1 compression functions (such as Davies-Meyer and Miyaguchi-Preneel) of both type I and type II are BPrA. We also show that the compression function of Shrimpton-Stam that uses non-compressing components is BPrA. The security proof for unbounded hash-tree schemes is very tight under the BPrA assumption. In order to have 2 s -security against back-dating, the hash function must have n = 2s + 4 output bits, assuming that the security of the hash function is close to the birthday barrier, i.e. that there are no structural weaknesses in the hash function itself. Note that the previous proofs that assume PrA gave the estimation n = 2s + 2 log 2 C + 2, where C is the maximum allowed size of the hash tree. For example, if s = 100 (2 100 -security) and C = 2 60 , the previous proofs require n = 322 output bits, while the new proof requires n = 204 output bits.
Introduction
Keyless time-stamping [10] was proposed by Haber et al in order to avoid keybased cryptography and trusted third parties so that time stamps become irrefutable proofs of time. A collection of C documents is hashed down to a single digest of a few dozen bytes that is then published in widely available media such as newspapers. Merkle hash trees [12] consists of all sibling hash values in the path from a document (a leaf of the tree) to the root of the tree. After the root hash value is published, it will be impossible for anyone to back-date a new document in terms of creating a hash chain from a new document to the already published hash value. In [1], a global-scale hash-tree scheme was drafted where during every unit of time a large hash tree is created co-operatively by numerous servers all over the globe and the root value is published in newspapers.
The security of hash-tree schemes against back-dating can be reduced to collision-resistance of the hash function. The first correct security proof was published in 2004 [6] , but this proof assumes that the size C of the global hash tree (the capacity of the scheme) is limited and the number n of the output bits of the hash function needed for 2 s -security was n = 4s + 2 log 2 C + 2, i.e. n depends on C (Tab. 1). This means that if the maximum hash tree size is 2 60 , then for 2 100 -security against back-dating one has to use 522-bit hash functions. The practical hash functions in such schemes might be 256-bit and twice larger output size will double the amount of data in the system.
The tightest possible proof of security [5] against back-dating under the collisionresistance assumption requires the output size n = 3s + log 2 C + 8, which in case C = 2 60 and s = 100 gives n = 368 (Tab. 1), which is still too large if one desires to use 256-bit hash functions in a global hash tree scheme. The proof in [5] has been shown to be asymptotically optimally tight if the collision-resistance property is used as the security assumption. So, the only way to obtain tighter security proofs is to use stronger (or incomparable) security assumptions for hash functions.
In [4], a tighter security proof was presented that used a stronger assumption called Pre-Image Awareness (PrA) (first proposed in [9]) instead of collisionresistance. The PrA condition makes sense if the hash function uses ideal components (ideal ciphers, random permutations, etc.). The proof under PrA required hash size n = 2s + 2 log 2 C + 2. This might be valuable for high security requirements, but for the case of C = 2 60 and s = 100 gives n = 322, which is still too large for using 256-bit hash functions, for example. Therefore, in [4], a new non-standard and seemingly just slightly stronger than PrA security assumption-Strong Pre-Image Awareness (SPrA)-was used to obtain a tighter security proof with required hash size n = 2s + 2 log 2 log 2 C + 2, which in case C = 2 60 and s = 100 gives n = 214. However, the SPrA is a new assumption and not sufficiently studied. In contrast to the PrA condition, which is known to hold for many cryptographic constructions of hash functions [9] , there are no similar proofs of SPrA. Considering the formal definition of SPrA, such proofs might be hard to construct, mostly because the SPrA condition involves arbitrary "parsing" functions.
In this work, we define another strenghtening of the PrA condition, the socalled Bounded Pre-Image Awareness (BPrA) that assumes the existence of an extractor E that is bounded in the sense that for any efficiently computable query string α, the number of outputs y for which E(y, α) succeeds does not exceed the number of queries in α. We show that many known PrA constructions actually are BPrA. For example, we show that blockcipher based MD-hash functions with
